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RIGHTS AND RIGHTS VIOLATORS: 
A NEW APPROACH TO THE NATURE OF RIGHTS* 
I n today's world, there is much talk about rights: women's rights, minorities' rights, children's rights, animals' rights, etc. There 
are groups devoted to seeing to it that each possible right is 
recognized and respected. And some philosophers have taken it 
upon themselves to defend the very existence of rights. Why are 
rights seen to be so important? 
Let me suggest that much of the importance we attach to rights 
derives from our desire to think of ourselves as qualitatively different 
from the "lower" animals. Part of what makes us different, so the 
story goes, is that we have more rights than they do, and that our 
rights are more significant than theirs (both in the sense that we have 
rights that are in themselves more significant than the rights had by 
other animals, such as our right to liberty; and in the sense that, in 
the event of there being a conflict between a person and another 
animal in respect to what seems to be the same right, say the "right to 
life," it is always the person's right that is supreme). 
Perhaps it is this perceived link between the superiority of persons 
over animals and the superiority of the rights of persons over the 
rights of animals that has led so many philosophers to pursue the 
question 'what is a right?' by considering what it is about persons 
which differentiates them from "mere" animals. An extension of this 
line of reasoning has then led them to wonder precisely which beings 
have rights and in virtue of which of their properties is it that they 
have these rights. 
In opposition to this approach, I would like to suggest that consid-
eration of the properties of a particular being in isolation provides 
insufficient data to determine the rights of that being; and, further-
more, that the nature of rights in general cannot be determined 
solely by consideration of the characteristics of those who are said to 
have rights. (Most of the discussion in this paper will be in terms of 
human rights but, as I hope will be clear, I take it that what I have to 
say can easily be extended to talk of any kind of rights-natural 
rights, legal rights, etc.) 
One who holds that a being's rights can be determined by consid-
eration of that being alone might well begin by claiming, in somewhat 
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more precise language, that sentient beings such as ourselves have 
the right not to be caused pain, and to add that such beings have this 
right in virtue of something having to do with their sentience. It is a 
commonplace, however, to note that broadly phrased rights claims 
such as this will not do. The dentist to whom I go to have a cavity 
filled does not violate a right of mine simply because her drilling 
causes me pain. Nor does the cavity, which caused the toothache, 
violate my right. 
My proposal is that we consider a new question: In virtue of what 
do we say that a being is capable of violating (or respecting) a right? 
It may seem strange to consider what can violate, or "break," a right 
in order to discover something about rights. Certainly we do not 
discover much about china vases by considering small children and 
bulls. Nevertheless, I believe we will find that this question sheds as 
much light on the nature of rights as does the seemingly more ap-
propriate question: In virtue of what does a being have a right? 
To begin our discussion, let us imagine the following scenario: 
Allison, a fully competent adult person, is sitting at home, quietly 
reading in her favorite armchair. Suddenly, a crash breaks the still-
ness of the evening, and Bertha appears in front of her. Bertha leaps 
at Allison and violently attacks her. Just as suddenly, Bertha disap-
pears, leaving Allison with a broken arm, and covered with scratches 
and bruises. Can we say of Allison that her rights have been violated? 
No doubt it is tempting to say that the above paragraph clearly 
describes a situation in which a person's rights have been violated. It 
must be recognized, however, that this is tempting only because we 
have made certain assumptions about Bertha. But, in fact, we have 
been told nothing about her. She may be something more or less in 
keeping with our assumptions, say, a hostile youth who wantonly 
beats unsuspecting persons. But perhaps she is a tormented para-
noid schizophrenic, mistakenly released from a mental institution, or 
a wild bear that has wandered into Allison's home from a nearby 
forest. 
Most will agree that, if Bertha is a hostile youth, then Allison's 
rights have been violated, whereas if Bertha is a wild bear, they have 
not. There will be more disagreement, I believe, over the case in 
which Allison has been attacked by Bertha the schizophrenic. 1 
I There are at least two factors that complicate the case of Bertha the paranoid 
schizophrenic. First, we are not sure how to assess the rational capabilities of a 
paranoid schizophrenic: Are we to evaluate his actions on the basis of his beliefs, in 
which case actions such as those of Bertha may be justified? Or are we to evaluate his 
actions on the basis of the "real" situation, in which case such actions are often 
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These various evaluations can only be correct if it is true that, in 
determining whether or not a certain act constitutes the violation of 
a right, we in fact do take into account not only the characteristics of 
that which is said to hold the right, but also the characteristics of that 
which performs the action said to violate the right. 
Actions, the external appearances of which are identical, will or 
will not be said to violate a right depending on whether or not a 
person2 is performing the action. So, a human-looking robot that 
malfunctions and stabs a person would not be said to have violated a 
right, whereas a person going through precisely the same motions 
would be said to be violating a right. (A robot that is programmed to 
stab a person probably is a means toward violating that person's 
right; nevertheless, it is not the robot that violates the right.) Or, to 
make the same point from the opposite direction, the animals and 
objects of children's stories can violate rights precisely because they 
are to be considered as persons. A malicious tea kettle that manages 
to spill boiling water on someone will be said to have violated that 
person's right not to be hurt. A real tea kettle that does what appears 
to be exactly the same thing will not be said to have violated any-
one's right. 
I would now like to suggest that the criteria that an entity must 
meet in order to be said to violate another's rights are more stringent 
than the criteria that an entity must meet in order to be said to have 
rights. To see this, consider the scene between Allison and Bertha in 
reverse-in this case Allison unprovokedly attacks Bertha. Most 
would agree that under any of the three descriptions of Bertha it 
would be said that Allison has violated her rights; and there is no 
doubt that, under either of the first two descriptions of Bertha (as a 
hostile youth, or as a paranoid schizophrenic), her rights will be said 
to have been violated. To take another example: if a small child, in 
the throes of a temper tantrum, injures an adult, we will not say that 
the child has violated the adult's rights. If, however, an adult in the 
throes of a tantrum inflicts comparable injuries on a small child, 
most of us will say that the child's rights have been violated. 
Let us stop to consider the case in which a child harms an adult. 
unjustified. Is a paranoid schizophrenic unable to recognize and respect the rights 
of others? If he is unable to recognize and respect the rights of others he cannot 
have violated Allison's right. 
The second factor to take into account is that others may have duties concerning 
Bertha the schizophrenic such that they will be said to have violated Allison's right 
by releasing Bertha. 
2 Although I am not going to attempt to define 'person', it should be noted that I 
do not intend it to be understood as synonymous with 'human being'. 
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Let us imagine that she bites him. If the child is a newborn, we would 
certainly not say that she has violated a right of the adult. Nor are we 
likely to say that the adult's right has been violated by a toddler in her 
testing stage. By the time the child is five, however, many will say that 
she violates the adult's right when she bites him. And by the age of 
eight or ten almost all would agree that the child does violate the 
adult's right. 
Whether or not one contends that human beings grow into their 
rights, we will all agree that we grow into our ability to recognize and 
respect the rights of others (and therefore that we grow into the 
ability to violate them as well). The newborn is presumably unable to 
differentiate between her own actions and the actions of those 
around her, and so it would be inappropriate to hold her responsible 
for her actions (if she can even be properly said to act). It is probably 
also inappropriate to hold a toddler to be morally responsible for her 
actions, but at this age the child is aware of being the originator of 
her own actions, and so it is now appropriate to attempt to affect her 
behavior through some sort of discipline. By the age of five, we are 
pretty sure that the child will have learned that being bitten hurts, 
and that her biting is therefore unacceptable. And by the time she is 
ten years old, we are certain that the intellectually and emotionally 
normal child will have learned that such behavior is forbidden; and 
we will hold her morally responsible for such actions. 
The ability to respect or violate the rights of others thus seems to 
rely on an intellectual (and emotional?) ability to recognize the harms 
one can do to another being, and the types of behavior considered to 
be inappropriate. Some philosophers, such as Michael Tooley,3 have 
tried to make the possession of a right contingent on a similar level of 
intellectual competence, but for the most part we recognize no such 
intellectual prerequisite for the possession of rights. There are many 
real disagreements in the literature over what is to be said to have 
rights, and why, and so I shall not attempt to give a list of sufficient 
conditions for possessing rights. Perhaps all that is common to the 
various accounts is the idea that the entity must be able to suffer 
harm (on one or another understanding of 'harm'). 
The fact that there is so much explicit disagreement over that in 
virtue of which an entity can be said to have a right, along with the 
fact that there is such implicit agreement in regard to that in virtue of 
which an entity can violate or respect aright, 4 leads me to suggest 
g "A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide," inJoe1 Feinberg, ed., The Problem of 
Abortion (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973), p. 60. 
4 As evidenced by the fact that the examples used by those who write on rights 
never involve inanimate objects violating rights, for example. 
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that in discussions of rights we are at least as concerned with rights 
violators or respecters and their behavior as we are with the holders 
of rights and their possessions. 
When we come to see the importance of the concepts of "respect-
ing" and "violating rights" as compared to the concept of "possess-
ing" or "having a right" we can begin to get a clearer picture of both 
what is correct and what is incorrect about many of the claims often 
made for rights. For instance, it is often said that the importance of 
having a right lies in the power it gives one to make a claim for some 
good. Thus, David Lyons5 says; 
When A, in particular, holds a certain right against B, A is a claimant 
against B. A "claimant" is one empowered to press or waive a claim 
against someone with a corresponding duty or obligation. He can, if he 
wishes, release the other from his obligation and cancel it, or he can 
insist upon its performance (ibid., p. 60). 
If 'to empower' is taken to mean "to give one the power to. . . ," 
however, one who has a right is certainly not necessarily empowered 
to press or waive a claim. A kidnapping victim who is bound and 
gagged certainly does not have the power to press or waive his claims 
against his captors. Nor does a comatose patient have this power in 
regard to her physicians or relatives. Moreover, many say that some 
rights are inalienable-that is, those who are said to hold such rights 
are disabled from waiving them, such as the rights to life and to 
liberty. Many persons also feel that at least some animals have some 
basic rights, such as the right not to be caused pain for no good 
reason. But to say that the having of a right empowers one to make a 
claim rules out all animal rights from the very beginning. To this 
extent, then, the idea that rights empower is incorrect. 6 Similar ex-
amples would also show that rights do not empower others to make 
claims on behalf of the rightholder. 
Nevertheless, we do expect others to refrain from kidnapping us 
and to help us when we are patients and cannot demand such help. 
To the extent that society is such that it makes these expectations 
reasonable we may consider ourselves to be thereby empowered. 
That is, we are empowered in a substantial way by rights only in so far 
5 "Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries," in David Lyons, ed., Rights (Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth, 1979). 
6 This point should not be confused with the assertion that having a right, or 
being said to have a right, has nothing to do with making claims. The having of a 
right is almost certainly necessary in order to press or waive a claim, but it is 
certainly not sufficient; nor does the pressing of a right guarantee that others will 
act in the desired manner. 
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as we are empowered by that behavior of others which we call "re-
specting rights." 
Joel Feinberg7 adds an interesting twist to the idea that rights are 
the grounds of claims. He holds that to have a right is to have a valid 
claim, and that to have a valid claim involves the ability of those to 
whom the claim is made to fulfill that claim. In other words, A can 
only be said to have a valid claim against B to do X if it is within B's 
power to do X: and A can only be said to have a right to X if there is 
someone who is able to do X. 
An implication of Feinberg's view is that we say of a person that he 
has a given right only in those situations which involve another entity 
which is capable of acting in such a way as to be said to be either 
respecting or violating that right. Therefore, one must know some-
thing about the potential rights violator before one can know about 
a right. 
Furthermore, as Feinberg himself notes, we do sometimes want to 
say of a given person or group of persons that they have certain 
rights even when, right now, no one is in a position to grant that to 
which they are said to have a right. He suggests that we admit the 
existence of claims in such instances, but due to his definition of 
'valid claim' he cannot call these claims valid, and therefore cannot 
associate them with existing rights (though he does call them the 
"grounds" for future rights). This type of reasoning forces Feinberg 
to say such things as that persons in underdeveloped countries may 
not have the right to even a minimal amount of food-e.g., if there is 
no one in a position to provide that food. He leaves it open how one 
is to justify the push that is often needed to make a "claim," such as 
the claim to food, into a "valid claim"; that is, how we would justify 
insisting that we work toward changing the situation so as to allow 
others, in the future, to be able to fulfill the claim. 
In a similar vein, it is said that rights are necessary for a secure 
society. Richard Wasserstrom8 tells us that, 
To live in a society in which there are rights and in which rights are 
generally respected is to live in a society in which the social environment 
has been made appreciably more predictable and secure. It is to be able 
to count on receiving and enjoying more objects of value. Rights have, 
therefore, an obvious psychological, as well as moral, dimension and 
significance (ibid., p. 49). 
7 "The Nature and Value of Rights," in Rights, pp. 46-56. 
8 Richard Wasserstrom, "Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination," in 
Rights, pp. 78-91. 
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Rights are often invoked in this way, but does Wasserstrom's con-
clusion as to the benefits of rights really follow from what he has 
said? If it is assumed that rights are the sort of thing persons have 
whether or not anyone can be said to be respecting those rights, the 
conclusion clearly does not follow from the fact that we are said to 
have rights. In fact, rights do not protect persons from arbitrary 
harms. No right protects me from being struck by lightning-nor 
does any moral right protect me from being electrocuted by a sadistic 
scientist. It is the scientist's behaving in that way which we may call 
"respecting my right not to be electrocuted" that protects me. As 
others do elsewhere, Wasserstrom slips in the phrase, above, 'and in 
which rights are generally respected' as if it were of minimal impor-
tance. But, of course, it is precisely persons acting in this way that 
makes a society secure. 
Realizing that rights talk is necessarily concerned with the actions 
of those we might call potential rights violators allows us to see that 
an important part of what we are discussing is the behavior of po-
tential rights violators. It is misleading and can be injurious to insist 
that the existence of a right be established before an action is for-
bidden. To say that I ought not to punch you because it would hurt 
you is sufficient-there is no further need to invoke that alleged 
thing that is your right not to be punched or hurt. Clearly, much of 
what is to be taken into account is the harm caused by our actions 
and the significance we give to that harm. 
This way of looking at rights talk makes it clear that a debate as to 
whether or not the members of a certain group-be it dolphins or 
ethnic minorities-have a given right is largely a debate over how 
those debating ought to behave toward members of that group. 
When we see rights in this way we understand that, more than the 
having of rights, it is what we call recognizing and respecting the 
rights of others which makes us persons, and raises us above "mere 
animals." 
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